Chapter 4 Encoding truths? Diagnosis-Related Groups and the fragility of the marketisation discourse by Feiler, Therese
 Introduction 1 
 Organisational reforms in healthcare are usually left to economists, public law 
scholars or social scientists. Intentionally or not, decision-making at the policy-
level often converts far-reaching decisions into technocratic jargon. Theologians 
have been somewhat on the margins of these debates. This is perhaps no surprise, 
considering the seemingly neutral focus on empirical measures typical of the dis-
course. Moreover, theological ethics are frequently limited to neuralgic issues such 
as euthanasia or preimplantation diagnostics. Nonetheless, the marketisation of 
healthcare has a theological dimension, also at the policy-level. 
 This chapter will take as an example a particular change in healthcare fi nancing 
at the meso-level: Diagnosis-Related Groups. DRGs marked a shift in the way 
hospitals were oriented and were the means to operationalise the market-logic in 
healthcare. The DRG system is a case classifi cation system: each hospital case is 
related to a ‘pre-standardised product’ of treatment. Depending on how a patient’s 
case is encoded, the hospital is reimbursed for the services provided. In this way, 
hospital care can be matched with pre-calculated resources. Case volumes can 
be predetermined according to the profi t needs of a hospital and an economy’s 
‘healthcare sector’ as a whole. Developed in the early 1980s by Robert B. Fet-
ter and John D. Thompson, a management and a public health scholar at Yale, 
DRGs were fi rst introduced in New Jersey, and have become the key accounting 
system throughout Western and increasingly LMI countries’ healthcare systems. 
(Mathauer and Wittenbecher 2013) Here I will particularly draw on examples from 
Germany, Switzerland and Scandinavia, but also to the NHS in England. 
 What follows is what one might call accompanying research, albeit in a counter-
point movement ( Ramsey 2016 ). The aim is to critically illuminate the theological 
structures of (sub-)systems such as the DRG. Four constitutive claims will be 
contested. First, the claim that marketisation is theologically neutral, inherent in 
the ‘clean’ language of ‘modernisation’ reforms. Rather, I argue, it is theologically 
grounded and implies theological interpretations of how acts of care should relate 
to political-economic structures; theology itself is a critical heuristic for different 
systemic challenges. Second, the adjacent assumption that marketisation is a natu-
ral, impersonal and global evolution will be contested. In contrast, the meaningful 
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nature of human history makes both individual and systemic responsibility pos-
sible in the fi rst place. Third, I will contest the claim that DRGs better represent
care. The codifi cation and thus distortion of care raises the question of whether and 
how to represent it truthfully. It will be suggested that meaningful representation 
has to  follow the event, rather than quench it out. Finally, against the claim that 
DRGs do not touch the substance of medical care, DRGs have in fact challenged 
the integrity of the medical profession, because they institutionalised contradic-
tory ‘logics’ of action – medical as opposed to managerial-economic. This invites 
refl ection on the meaning of vocation as an irreducible aspect to the human being 
and medical practice. These four theological counterpoints to the DRG system – 
theological signifi cance, historical-systemic responsibility, representation and 
vocation – destabilise the marketisation discourse exemplifi ed by the DRG system, 
relocate it and raise the stakes of the debate. 
 1.  The patient follows the money : marketisation as 
theological shift and transvaluation 
 DRGs classify clinical cases according to several variables: principal and second-
ary diagnoses, patient age and sex, the presence of co-morbidities and complica-
tions, and the procedures performed. Depending on how the clinical case is then 
coded, reimbursement for each delivered pre-standardised “product” is released 
to the hospital by payers such as statutory health insurances, Medicare, private 
insurers, or Clinical Commissioning Groups. In the NHS, for example, operations 
are coded using the Offi ce of Population, Censuses and Surveys Classifi cation 
of Surgical Operations and Procedures (OPCS) system. These operation codes, 
together with diagnostic codes such as the ICD-10, are then converted to generate 
Healthcare Resource Group (HRG) codes, the English version of DRGs. In the 
system of “Payment by Results” (PbR) they generate the tariff for reimbursement 
to the Trust ( Department of Health 2013 ). In the NHS, as in other systems, DRGs 
have remained one hospital fi nancing mechanism besides others such as block 
grants, per capita payments and public investment. And whereas block grants are 
arguably on the state end of the spectrum of fi nancing mechanisms, DRGs or 
‘activity-based funding’ are on the market end, putting a price on each activity 
( Marshall et al. 2014 ). 
 The great selling-point of DRGs was that they were to allow ‘money to follow 
the patient’ ( OECD 2004 ; Kimberly et al. 2008;  Busse et al. 2011 ). This almost 
mythical phrase alludes to the familiar idea that patients are ends in themselves, 
which translates into ‘patient-centredness’, ‘patient choice’ and focus on ‘out-
comes’. However, because of their  prospective nature, DRGs pre-determine the 
categories into which both patients and doctors must fall. As a ‘currency’ they 
are used for budget projection and rationalisation to increase ‘effi ciency’ and, or, 
profi ts. Targets for activities and volumes are set in advance; bonus payments to 
clinicians can be related to pre-agreed numbers of cases in a given time-interval, 
irrespective of patients’ actual needs. In this industrial model of contracted 
‘instances of care’, payment is released according to specifi c numbers of coded 
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cases. Unless the system is gamed to their advantage, the coding thus determines 
how patients are treated. In other words:  The patient has to follow the money. 
 For this reason, DRG reforms were a fundamental, paradigmatic shift, ‘the 
largest and most thoroughgoing reforms of fi nancing, but also of perspectives, 
of working and acting in the healthcare system’ ( Braun 2014 , p. 91, also  Bode 
2011 ). It consists both in the relocation of the patient into a market logic, and the 
simultaneous redefi nition of the patient as consumer-citizen which  conceals this 
relocation: we now talk of consumer-clients, healthcare “delivery”, instances of 
care that can be traded, scaled up, etc. The new defi nition of healthcare, its logic 
and  telos , amounts to a ‘transvaluation’ ( Umwertung ), to use a Nietzschean term. 2 
This was operationalised, amongst others, through DRGs. 
 1.1  Theology and the nature of the healthcare system 
 There are several starting points for a theological consideration of this develop-
ment. First, the  historical project unearths the genealogy of the market as we know 
it (see also below). Max Weber and Richard H. Tawney recognised the religious 
presuppositions of industrial capitalism, but more recently also several theologians 
( Kidwell and Doherty 2015 ; Skidelsky 2015). Both with and against sociology 
they have pointed at the Calvinist heritage of ‘inner-worldly ascetics’, for whom 
making money was a  religious vocation. In one contemporary Anglo-Catholic 
interpretation, the Reformation’s emphasis primarily on a person’s faith led to a 
‘dis-connection of reality’ from God: bared of all intrinsic justice and good end(s), 
the world became ‘an arbitrary set of disconnected things’ ( Milbank 2015 ) and 
the market an exchange of mere ‘stuff’. Whether the Reformation is to blame in 
this way must be contested. Either way, the market is theologically conditioned. 
 Conversely, organisational structures of healthcare have been an intrinsic part 
of the Church’s refl ection on its service to others ( diakonía ) as a ‘fruit of faith’ 
( Turre 1991 ). In the Middle Ages an aspect of charitable endowments and the 
monasteries’ work, care for the sick was signifi cantly re-ordered in the course of 
the Reformation. And whilst the Lutheran strand increasingly tasked the state with 
the provision of public healthcare, the Calvinist tradition embraced a more entre-
preneurial model. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, besides the 
socialist movement, Lutheran as well as Catholic social ethics played an impor-
tant role in the institution of the modern welfare state. These ‘religious schemes 
of interpretation’ continue to ‘format what one can call invisible social policy’ as 
well as ‘the non-economic foundations of economic action’. They undergird the 
different models of healthcare provision until today. ‘To put it poignantly,’ writes 
Gerhard Wegner, ‘neoliberalism then would be the Calvinists’ belated revenge on 
the Wittenbergians’ ( Wegner 2015 , pp. 18–19). 
 Second, in line with this historical-theological continuum, there is a persistent 
systematic-theological aspect to the relationship between care for the sick and the 
market. It touches upon the grounds of the welfare state as that which has tradition-
ally mediated between the two. As Zimmermann-Acklin has pointed out ( 2010 , 
p. 110), there is now a signifi cant ‘contextual gap’ between theological refl ection 
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and the modern welfare state, despite their shared history. Some theologians medi-
ate this gap by adopting the language of human and constitutional rights or shared 
concepts of human dignity. Others have traditionally sought to corrode it by refer-
ence to natural law (the more Catholic approach) and its principles of solidarity, 
subsidiarity and personhood. Schnabl, for example, writes: ‘ Solidarity transforms 
the content of neighbour love into the fi eld of the structural and the institutional. 
With this, a central ethical content of the Jewish-Christian tradition is spelled out 
into a sphere which in modernity can precisely no longer be developed’ (Schnabl 
cit. in Zimmermann-Acklin 2010, p. 113). This is an admittedly ‘reduced theol-
ogy’, in which faith easily shrinks down to a mere individual motivation, but the 
religious substance remains latent. 
 Third, this invites a reference to the  sui generis theological debate around the 
being and nature of God in relation to the world. This debate sets the premises for 
the considerations just mentioned. In the light of this meta-narrative, historical 
and systematic forms can be analysed. In other words, theology functions as a 
heuristic for the  logic of healthcare and economics, their modern relationship, and 
the nature of that debate. Reference may be made to the divine economy of grace, 
which is presented as profoundly  uneconomical . Creation, redemption and the new 
creation are acts of divine generosity (Exod. 3:7–8b). This economy is at work in 
the liberation both from economic slavery (“the house of bondage”, Exod. 20:2; 
Deut. 5:6, 7‒21) and from egotistical desires (“And he died for all, that those who 
live might live no longer for themselves but for him who for their sake died and 
was raised” [1 Cor. 5:14‒15]). 
 This uneconomical logic recurs in scriptural passages on material wealth. Prov-
erbs, for example, appreciates wealth, albeit in the context of wisdom (Prov 11:4). 
Ezekiel meets the market in the context of critical suspicion to the point of hostil-
ity. The prophetic thread continues in the New Testament, where the impending 
divine kingdom engenders an acute, if not disturbing, rejection of material goods 
and economic considerations (Mark 10:25; Mt 19:24; Lk 18:25). Salvation through 
the cross would be interpreted as an uneconomically economic event: according 
to Anselm of Canterbury’s theory of atonement, Christ made a restitutive ‘pay-
ment’ to God. The infi nite debt owed as a result of human transgression against 
an infi nite God, so the understanding, could only be paid with the sacrifi cial death 
of a God-man. Through faith, infi nite divine judgment would be avoided. Thus 
the participation of faith in this divine plenitude was to overcome the economy of 
transgression, debt and repayment ( Bell 2005 ;  Benjamin 1991 ). 
 Over against the logic of the market – managing scarcity in the light of confl ict-
ing interests – divine plenitude, existence as such, suggests a strong logical, and 
possibly ontological primacy of nurture and care; reconciliation is understood 
as  healing . Not least the parable of the Good Samaritan indicates compassion 
in principle encompasses everyone rather than a merely contractually founded 
society ( Zimmermann-Acklin 2010 , p. 117). Hence the market requires signifi -
cant boundaries, reorientation and redefi nition; it cannot determine its own ends. 
In every case, the above juxtaposition avoids, and even polemicises against the 
absolute confl ation of the late capitalist market logic and that of healthcare. Even 
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more so since this confl ation effectively amounts to the  separation and  silencing 
of genuine healthcare from the managerial health economy. Care for its own sake 
becomes a subjective motivation, a ‘black box’ (Powell cit. in Bode and Vogd 
2016, p. 9) or an ideologically imposed fi ction, threatening with its ‘moraline-
acidic’ paternalism ( Patzen 2010 ; Savulescu and Schuklenk 2017). 
 Since the early nineteenth century the main churches have continuously wres-
tled with their relegation to pure internal subjectivity. Recent scholars have set 
ecclesial practice as a counter-corporation against managerialism and market cor-
porations ( Long et al. 2007 ). This does not necessarily suggest the uneconomic 
logic of gift may fully replace economic systems. But a horizon of plenitudinous 
gift that is existence as such is the ground for solidary, diaconic forms of healthcare 
here. It also inserts signifi cant  doubt into any healthcare system that is a) based 
on the maximisation of individual utility, b) is oriented towards – or happens to 
result in – the mere upwards-moving extraction of profi t, and that c) redefi nes all 
aspects of healthcare to that effect. Such doubt is particularly strong in healthcare, 
which addresses the loss and scarcity of physical suffering, often correlated with 
economic disadvantage and loss. 
 In the U.S., Scandinavia and Germany, increasingly privatised hospitals cer-
tainly have used DRGs to maximise their income, often at the cost of patients. 
Strategies associated with DRGs include e.g. the ‘cream-skimming’ of patients 
with particularly lucrative conditions. This has resulted in unnecessary invasive 
procedures, but also multiple re-admissions after “bloody” hospital discharges 
(i.e. before patients had recovered), as well as the relative neglect of patients with 
chronic diseases. Setting targets through DRGs for particular treatments allowed 
for an artifi cial increase or decline in the number of fi nancially rewarding cases. 
DRGs have also been used to generate hospital income by either making use 
of the codes’ fl exibility (‘DRG-creep’, upcoding or upgrading) or by straightfor-
ward fraudulent coding at large scales ( Neby et al. 2015 ;  Balleisen 2017 , p. 365). 
The Payment-by-Results system in the NHS ‘relies on honesty and transparency 
between commissioners and providers of clinical services, both working on behalf 
of patients and in their best interests’ ( Chambers et al. 2010 ). But there are no 
grounds for romanticising the NHS: like others, it is under ‘pressures to cook the 
books’ ( Cooper 2016 , cp.  Brennan et al. 2012 ). 
 2.  Marketisation: ‘natural evolution’ and 
systemic (ir)responsibility 
 A previous point – the possibility that marketisation is just something that 
 happens – is particularly pertinent to the global narrative of New Public Man-
agement (NPM) reforms in general and the DRG in particular. This narrative 
makes frequent reference to impersonal, naturalistic images: the new ‘landscape’ 
of healthcare, the organisational ‘environment’ that is ‘emerging’. The OECD 
consistently presented DRGs as a global development, the natural thrust of pro-
gressive modernisation in the face of objective necessities. This language also 
pervades critical assessments, e.g. when Ingo Bode talks about a ‘maelstrom of 
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evolutionary processes’ ( Bode and Vogd 2016 , p. 6). Such imagery chimes with 
neoliberal thought, which the late Duncan B.  Forrester (1997 ) explored in a useful 
study of Friedrich A. von Hayek’s work. Forrester’s analysis illuminates the ahis-
toricity and the ensuing lack of political responsibility inherent in marketisation, 
which also explains its resilience in the face of countervailing evidence. This will 
prompt the second theological counterpoint: history as meaningfully structured. 
 Hayek distinguishes between two kinds of orders: fi rst, ‘contrived orders’, 
devised by humans to serve their purposes. This is what the Greeks called  taxis , 
and is illustrated by a line of battle in which the individual is no longer free but 
under orders. Contrived orders are distinct from ‘spontaneous orders’, organic 
growths that are not the result of human planning, decision or calculation.  Hayek 
(1982 , cit. in  Forrester 1997 ) calls these the  kosmos , ‘orderly structures which 
are the product of the action of many men but are not the result of human design’ 
(p. 143). Forrester points out: ‘A spontaneous order has no purpose, no  telos ; it has 
not been brought into being by an outside agency . . . it has “just growed”’ (p. 143). 
Hayek understood the market as such a spontaneous order, the only one in which 
individuals could freely pursue their interests, goals and purposes. The market, 
according to Hayek, is ‘“an impersonal process which brings about a greater sat-
isfaction of human desires than any deliberate human organization could achieve”’ 
(p. 143). Forrester highlights that Hayek adopts the term  catallaxy for the market 
order. The word certainly invokes a form of exchange, but Hayek also welcomes 
connotations of ‘to admit into community’ and ‘to turn from enemy into friend’. 
He effectively mirrors, and partly parodies, Hobbes’  Leviathan , the powerful state 
that stifl es the civil war always lurking just under the surface. However nuanced 
their collusion, then, market and state remain profoundly at odds with theologies 
of plenitude and teleology. 
 The ahistorical nature of Hayek’s market warrants further attention. It is no coin-
cidence that marketisation gained steam from the 1990s onwards, when Francis 
Fukuyama famously declared the ‘end of history’. From a systematic-theological 
perspective, the God that acts in history markedly contrasts with the idea that a 
spontaneously emerging  catallaxy remains unaffected by conveniently pluralis-
tic human values. The nature of God’s interactions with Israel as  historical is 
already part of early Israelite faith. Though now virtually impossible to historically 
reconstruct, early biblical ‘original stories’ are repeatedly commemorated: biblical 
narration itself largely consists of repetition, remembering and retelling earlier 
material. Historical political events are  theologically interpreted throughout later 
writings (e.g. the fall of Judah as divine judgement on Israel’s sin in the prophets). 
In the New Testament, the events around Jesus of Nazareth are located in a specifi c 
time and space, i.e. fi rst-century Palestine. ‘Here history becomes serious, without 
being sanctifi ed’ ( Bonhoeffer 2009 , p. 104). Up until the Enlightenment, the Bible 
was a key to world history; the differentiation between profane history and salva-
tion history dates from that era. Their relationship certainly resists homogeneity 
both in the Bible and contemporary debate. Yet whilst the Bible without history is 
prone to become simplifi ed and ideologised so any human, culturally meaningful 
institution requires the horizon of history ( Frey  et al. 2009 , p. xxii). Put differently, 
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for any institution to be legitimate, history itself must be meaningful; this sense is 
perhaps a residue of history-as-salvation history ( Schaper 2009 ;  Milbank 2015 ). 
Retelling the history of marketisation, and DRGs in particular, is to understand it 
as part of our social, political and cultural negotiations, which are hardly bound 
by the determinism of a brute nature. 
 As for the DRGs, before they were introduced, hospital fi nancing was largely 
framed by political structures. Whilst negotiation skills were certainly required of 
hospital managers, elected politicians were held accountable for budget decisions. 
Hospitals received their funding for the treatment given to patients, covering  ret-
rospectively the costs incurred. A frequent complaint about this system was that it 
led to lengthy stays in hospitals for lack of incentives to discharge patients swiftly, 
longer waiting lists and, consequently, altogether fewer hospital admissions. The 
argument was that this keeps “activity” low. But already this argument was part 
of the cultural drive to (re-)turn healthcare into an economic ‘sector’ and, in the 
U.S., to reverse the post-war settlement (Gaffney 2014; Chilingerian 2008). DRGs 
spread with the varying political champions of healthcare marketisation, such as 
Reagan in the U.S., Thatcher in the UK, or the Social Democrats in Germany. In 
Greece and Ireland, they were adopted as late as 2013 and 2014 as part of the Euro-
pean budget discipline (under German oversight) in the wake of the fi nancial crisis 
(Burke et al. 2016). Yet these events require interpretation, locating the interpreter 
and his future possibilities. Hence,  history marks a signifi cant counterpoint to the 
natural-evolutionary imagery accompanying marketisation. In the remembrance 
of alternatives, history functions as a depository of freedom. 
 2.1  Systemic (ir)responsibility 
 On the back of the market as an ahistorical order, Hayek effectively limits 
systemic, political responsibility for a just social order, which makes Petratos’ 
(2018) neat allocation of responsibilities in the present volume diffi cult to sus-
tain. Hayek does assume that justice exists as an objective reality, which is 
why Forrester thinks there is an ontology at work here. But as a minimal set 
of rules or procedures, justice ‘has nothing to do with aiming at just goals or 
attempting to bring about a just situation’ (cit. in  Forrester 1997 , p. 145). 3 In the 
Great Society Hayek imagined, justice is minimised to individuals and families 
seeking their own private goods, again chiefl y in the market. Meanwhile, ques-
tions of human purpose are relegated to the private realm. Procedural justice has 
no common good, shared goals or neighbourliness in view. Indeed, for Hayek 
such terms smack of the stifl ing, not least moral collectivism, the ‘teleocracy’ 
(cit. in Forrester p. 150) he discerned in fascist and socialist totalitarianisms. 
Rather than heeding a just order, ‘interpersonal transactions are a “game” in 
which the behaviour of the players, but not the result, can be just or unjust, and 
the behaviour includes the intentions of the players’. Hence it may be unjust to 
 intend to damage another person or their interest, but ‘justice is not concerned 
with those unintended consequences of a spontaneous order which have not been 
deliberately brought about by anybody’ (p. 147). 
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 This narrative certainly accompanies the DRGs. The problems we noted earlier 
are not identifi ed as result of the intrinsic logic of a coherent political-economic 
agenda (which requires deliberative re-conception). Rather, they appear as a collec-
tion of ‘unintended’ consequences that can be fi xed – not without a sense of naïve 
progressivism – if only all diverse ‘stakeholders’ were to procedurally collaborate 
( Cots et al. 2011 ;  Bystrov et al. 2015 ;  Numerof and Abrams 2016 ). Various forms of 
tinkering, so the hope, will minimise the ‘unintended consequences’ and ‘maximise 
the intended consequences’. Again, even critics of DRGs repeat this interpretation. 
 The effect of this Hayekian understanding can be seen not only medicine. 
Despite – or because of – the increased focus on the individual as object of concern 
and subject of responsibility, responsibility for  systemic decisions is diffused and 
untraceable, and that responsibility effectively evaporates in a fi eld of impersonal 
forces. Attributable intentions together with systemic agency disappear, replaced 
by omission and oblivion. A single actor may be reactively picked out and sanc-
tioned (individual cases of fraud in fi nance or medical institutions), which functions 
mainly as a deterrent. Yet the systemic question is muted. Representative political 
responsibility for marketisation is relegated to administrative re-organisation in the 
face of necessity, ‘replacing the government of persons by the administration of 
things’ (Engels cit. in  Berlin 1998 , p. 191). 4 Not least for this reason the marketi-
sation of healthcare progressed slowly over decades, largely unaffected by party-
political divisions. In Germany, for example, networks around the Bertelsmann 
Foundation since the early 1990s were particularly active in directly short-cutting 
to administrators. As Tanja  Klenk (2011 ) noted, the de-politicisation of structural 
reforms was welcomed by left parties too. It allowed them to blame politically 
sensitive hospital closures on impersonal market mechanisms. 
 In contrast, as we saw, historically grown healthcare systems are  always already 
the result of (implicit theologically grounded) truth commitments. Their form at 
the macro, meso- and micro-level both refl ects and is challenged by these com-
mitments. Understood as the fi eld of decision and systemic responsibility, history 
is the opposite of the amoral luck of ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ in the anonymity of 
marketised public administration. Hence the DRGs, like other ‘structural reforms’ 
must be re-included in cultural, philosophical and political negotiations. Not 
because they have been excluded, but because they are  already part of them (cp. 
 Bode and Vogd 2016 ). 
 3.  The representation of care – codifi cation and distortion 
 Health-economic discipline and effi ciency demand the translation of medical work 
into quantifi able units, especially in hospitals. And by grouping ‘an almost infi nite 
number of patients receiving in patient care into a fi nite number of groups of 
comparable patients’, it became possible to ‘characterise more precisely the “out-
put” of hospitals – besides “cases” – and to represent it internally and externally 
transparently in a way that allows for comparison between hospitals and periods’ 
( Busse et al. 2013 , p. 57). DRGs, and similarly QALYs and DALYs (Quality- or 
Disability-Adjusted Life Years) in England, thus suggest representation of care 
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through repetitive identifi cation (‘A QALY is a QALY is a QALY’) and codifi ca-
tion with a distinct utilitarian drift. 
 Once connected to marketisation (budget projection, revenue and profi t cre-
ation, competition between hospitals), this codifi cation frequently distorts rather 
represents care as it is actually given: 
 The system today rewards complications more than it rewards treatment with-
out complications; it creates diagnoses instead of representing them by setting 
incentives that promise plenty of income. The system deters expensive treat-
ments if they cannot or cannot adequately be coded. 
 ( Baehr 2014 ) 
 Similarly, Bartholomeyczick (2010 cit. in  Bode 2016 , p. 212) criticises the ‘invis-
ibility of care in the systematics of DRG-based hospital fi nancing’, where actual 
differences between patients’ concrete needs cannot be taken into account. And 
because the main diagnosis is the key economically, doctors ‘must only look at 
the diagnosis; why the patient is here, and everything else besides, plays no role. 
And so the patient is treated like a disease, unfortunately, not as a person’ (Braun 
et al. 2009, cit. in Maio 2014, p. 32). 
 As part of the transvaluation mentioned above marketisation has created 
what one might call an aporetic, ‘unhappy’ simultaneity of total representation 
and non-representation. On the one hand, ever more “transparency” suggests 
increased measurement and control. On the other hand, this coincides with a 
kind of  utopianisation : the increased non-representation of real care. It remains 
a ‘black box’ ( Bode and Vogd 2016 ), even if not  necessarily to the detriment 
of patients . For a long time, this problem was tacitly acknowledged as mental 
health was exempt from the DRGsystem. In this area, ‘success’ is particularly 
unpredictable and untranslatable. Even if diagnoses are identical, the length of 
hospitalisation depends on the doctor, the psychiatric institution, on patients 
themselves and their personal circumstances ( Meyera and Holzer 2015 ;  Pfi ster 
Lipp 2014 ). 
 Theologically, the situation describes the nature and possibility of images. In the 
Old Testament (OT), the well-known injunctions against images of God (Ex 20:4; 
Dtn 4:16) deny the possibility of an ‘object’. God – who is who he is (Ex 3:14) – is 
exempt from all representation. He is a ‘black box’ too, who only reveals himself in 
words. There are images, e.g. outside the Jerusalem temple, but they are restricted 
to human and other creaturely forms. The main point of the injunction was to avoid 
the confl ation of object and divinity (i.e. magic). But already in the OT this is 
somewhat “upset” by the idea that human beings are made in the ‘image of God.’ 
 Their adequate representation consists in treating them with justice and mercy, 
especially the weakest. In the New Testament, however, with the Incarnation the 
divine unseen becomes seen and manifest in word, image and body. The non-
representable has been represented in Christ. Conversely, Christ ‘re – presents’ 
humanity to God. The human being is now partly already participating in divine 
plenitude – and, in turn,  its non-representability. 
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 What follows from this for human representations or images of the divine 
has generated controversy. Broadly speaking, for Eastern interpreters, images 
of e.g. Christ function as an index that points towards the divine; they are 
iconic, both hand-made paintings and divine. In Western churches, represent-
ing the un-representable results in ‘profane’ art as the hand-made sugges-
tion of the plenitudinous. Art then becomes also indicative for other forms 
of  representation – political, administrative, economic – which concern what 
cannot be fully captured even in the human. These areas of social life must be 
re-thought from and towards the non-representable, yet again without confl ation 
(as in “politics as art”). By the same token, any reductionism is ‘iconoclastic’ 
once it comprehensively blots out its own object, the human being. And it 
becomes ‘idolatrous’ once it mistakes the image (or ‘code’) for the thing itself 
– as seen in the DRG system. 
 More often than not, health economists and policy-makers are well aware that 
DRGs, QALYs and DALYs are not the whole picture, and that every patient is dif-
ferent. The point of economic vehicles of calculation was never a true knowledge 
of the object,  Vogd (2016 ) points out. Nonetheless, some have sought to address 
the gap between care and calculus by introducing ‘quality measures’ into the DRGs 
(cp.  OECD 2017 ). But effectively this exacerbates the problem. To quantify quality 
means to accept the Wittgensteinian dictum that ‘there is nothing beyond the text’, 
that compassion and mutual recognition could be measured, converted and cashed 
in on. It ‘delegitimises the non-measurable’ (Maio 2014, p. 80) more emphatically. 
Hence, insisting that there  is something non-representable that escapes the current 
system remains preferable to expanding that system: ‘Every feedback and learning 
loop of the DRG system will only lead to a more complex representation, which 
prompts new adjusting movements on the provider side with the aim to even better 
exploit the DRG system’ ( Vogd 2016 , p. 291). 
 An alternative, more ‘representative’ coding system would have to participa-
tively  follow and  respond to actual healthcare, that which cannot be ‘coded’, in 
a way that assures its continued possibility. Every representation of an act must 
be a response that allows for a renewed instantiation of the act ( Williams 2014 , 
p. 67). In other words,  retrospective systems are more adequate, and as mentioned, 
continue to exist alongside prospective systems. Retrospective representation in 
that sense is more ‘iconic’: a constant process of adjustment between clinical and 
managerial logics (and staff), albeit under the umbrella of communal, regional and 
national common goods ( pace  Albach et al. 2016 ). Consequently, health-economic 
considerations, fi nancing systems and management systems need to be short-
circuited with hard questions about justice for every polity, which includes hospital 
ownership, anti-fraud mechanisms, waste, etc. This collides with the ‘market’-
claim that justice consists in every individual getting what they want at any point 
in time, a promise transported by the ‘ethical’ formulas of ‘patient-centredness’ 
and ‘money follows the patient’ (cp. Epstein in this volume). These imply that all 
allocative decisions are ultimately based on arbitrary ‘lines in the sand’ and suggest 
justice presupposes wealth – which is to put the cart before the horse and hence, 
defer it indefi nitely. 5 
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 4.  Economic logic and vocation 
 The fi nal point then, frequently made in connection with the DRGs, concerns 
the responsibilities of those working  within the marketised healthcare system. As 
healthcare has been relocated and redefi ned in market terms, those interacting 
with patients remain standing and working at the borderline between the market 
system’s logic and their actual responsibilities towards patients. Giovanni Maio 
(2014) recently described the ‘overgrowth of medicine by economics’ in the clini-
cal setting by what he calls ‘structural patronising’. He observes a  
 mental appropriation of doctors, as they are subtly introduced to the idea of 
distancing themselves from their own ideals. Or at least they are implicitly 
taught that those are at least as important as the economic demands of the 
business. The danger here is that this new hierarchy of values is not explicitly 
mandated, but rather that doctors are subliminally guided to internalise this 
hierarchy, now presented as an objective necessity, so that in the end it looks 
like a  voluntary acceptance . 
 (Maio 2014, p. 29) 
 That includes the internalisation of time pressures, which leads to self-exploitation 
(burn-out) and the individual, moral internalisation of what are, in reality, struc-
tural defi cits. Hence, healthcare workers have a permanently bad conscience about 
their putative failures. (Maio 2014, pp. 55, 86) 
 Maio also describes the different ways in which the ‘medical logic is turned onto 
its head’ by economic considerations: over- and under-diagnosis go hand in hand, 
the patient as a whole person falls out of sight; there is a lack of time and engage-
ment as patience, conscientiousness and exchanges with colleagues are devalued 
under the ‘dictat of time effi ciency’ (Maio 2014, p. 53). Indifference is legitimised. 
 Now there is no longer a standardisation that puts together symptoms as one 
clinical picture, but a standardisation according to a purely industrial credo. 
Standardisation is no longer done in order to understand what is general in the 
particular personal history of a patient and how it can be treated effectively 
according to general rules and laws, but rather standardisation in order to go 
into a serial production with patients, and to achieve an industrial increase 
of effi ciency. [. . .] now humans, like objects, are subjected to an industrial 
production process. 
 (Maio 2014, p. 63) 
 Maio sees the subsequent ‘moral dissonance’ as going to the substance of the 
profession: ‘As doctors are more and more deprived of their spaces of free deci-
sion and hence the possibility to identify with their profession, patients are also 
indirectly deprived, because they can only be well cared for if doctors practice 
their profession out of a deep commitment and with joy’ (Maio 2014, p. 84). This 
clash for professionals between the economic and medical logics, ranging from 
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subtle to stark, has been observed since the early days of DRGs (Flintrop 2006, 
Braun 2010). Bode (2010, p. 203) notes the system imposes a ‘double reality’, so 
that professionals have to '"serve two masters"' (Bode 2016, p. 255). 
 This clash of logics also has a theological dimension. It crystallises the relation-
ship between work and enjoyment, between law and gospel. Martin  Hengel (2008 ) 
has traced the notion of work as it developed in early Christianity before the back-
drop of the OT and aristocratic Greco-Roman environment. The latter despised 
work altogether in favour of  theoría . Although still done joyfully in paradise (a 
point Luther for some time underplayed), work becomes a chore after the Fall: 
‘Cursed is the ground because of you; in toil you shall eat of it all the days of your 
life’ (Gen 3:17;  Hengel 2008 , p. 465). But this is not unambiguous. At least fruitful 
work is praised as a divine gift, and frequently blessings are sought for it (Qoh 
3:9–12; Ps 90, 128:2). A moral duty to work is a later rabbinic development, but 
there’s a duty not to be idle. At the same time, work is interrupted by the Sabbath 
for all of creation ‘to participate in God’s rest’ ( Hengel 2008 , p. 437). In the NT, 
work is then altogether  transvalued : Jesus’ proclamation of the divine kingdom is a 
‘great and fi nal “interruption”’ ( Hengel 2008 , p. 442). Work has a double meaning 
now: it is a service for the divine kingdom 6 and done selfl essly for the neighbour 
in need. The daily job for a living (Paul was a tent-maker) takes the back seat. It 
shouldn’t be dropped though, as some of Paul’s enthusiastic audiences thought. 
 Yet details matter in how these pairs of work and rest, and then work and wor-
ship, are interpreted. Karl Barth, for example, not only contrasted the ‘idolisation’ 
of modern industrialised work with Sabbath rest, but thought all work fi nds mean-
ing in the Sabbath: ‘it points [man] away from everything that he himself can will 
and achieve and back to what God is for him and will do for him’ (cit. in Hughes 
2007). The late John Hughes critiqued this Barthian differentiation between the 
‘active life’ of worship-in- diakonía and employment-work as overly stark, even 
though that prevents the ‘glib liberal celebration of capitalism and its work-ethic’ 
(Hughes 2007, p. 15). 
 Esther Reed somewhat counters Barth by insisting on the redemption of work. 
In her view, proclaiming the hoped-for future of transfi guration and eternal res-
urrection, Christians are freed from the ultimacy of everyday work. Reed also 
insists that the resurrection means work has eternal signifi cance because nothing 
included in God’s future will be lost. ( Reed 2010 , pp. 100–104). Nonetheless, her 
heavy-heavenly signifi cance of honesty, good quality work, ‘respect for clients’ 
lacks transformative implications. Especially in hospitals where a clash of the 
standardised-industrialised logic with the medical logic is not without victims, 
Reed’s curious insistence on the presence of God even ‘in the darkest and most 
cruel workplaces’ seems to bridge the Barthian gap less effectively than expected. 
This is similar to Maio (2014), it should be added, who suggests a ‘dialogue’ 
between the economic and medical – after he has shown that the premises for such 
a dialogue are no longer given. 
 Hughes, for his part, combines the critiques of the Frankfurt School with 
Romantic and Catholic strands of thought. He also notes that ‘labour whose only 
end is effi ciency and functionality, free of responsibility, intellect and delight, is 
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 sub-human work’. Unlike the Frankfurt School’s hope in the negative power of 
critique, however, he suggests work depends on a vision of true labour, i.e. the 
creative work of God. The artist is his best analogy: 
 God creates purely for the sake of the thing being created, gratuitously, out 
of sheer delight. He does not create out of any need or lack in himself, nor 
instrumentally for any other purpose. God works for no other reward than his 
love for the thing made.  
 ( Hughes 2007 , p. 226) 
 Hughes then thinks human work should be analogical participation in that divine 
labour, a ‘liturgical offering to God’, and hence indistinguishable from the con-
templation of God. 
 Hughes thus somewhat drops the notion of vocation, which in the Protestant 
tradition recognises even the most profane work as a service to God, indeed quite 
so whilst remaining ‘profane’. He thinks it over-exalts mere employment and 
under-rates the creative, beautiful aspects of work as  vita activa . Keeping in mind 
the dangers that come with such a notion of vocation, however, it retains two 
important aspects. First, vocation is the form and being of human freedom that 
cannot be exhaustively explained or justifi ed (e.g. “Why do you want to be a 
doctor?”). Economic expertise can also function as a service – and vocation – to 
this end. Second, precisely because of its correlation with freedom, vocation has 
a transformative potential. Care depends on a notion of freedom that transcends 
different immanent logics as such, as Hughes is aware. Again, the genuinely politi-
cal form can hardly be subtracted, since corporate solidarity, justice and power in 
healthcare is  eo ipso structural. Hence, more than a ‘dialogue’ between medicine 
and economics in Maio’s sense is needed. A substantial rethinking of marketisation 
as a comprehensive intellectual paradigm entails relocating the political-economic 
in the service of medicine as an irreducible practice of solidarity-in-suffering. This 
implies both rethinking the economic order, and fl anking critiques such as Maio’s 
or Hughes’ with political and managerial responsibilities for healthcare workers. 
 5.  Conclusion 
 Theology, says Paul Ricoeur, emerges at the intersection between ‘a space of 
experience’ and ‘a horizon of hope’ (cit. in  Gutierrez 2009 , p. 323). In this sense, 
marketisation of healthcare is brittle in terms of its conceptualisation and invites 
sharp critique. Such critique is always already taking place on the theological ter-
ritory briefl y mapped out here. 
 Marketisation, exemplifi ed by the DRG discourse, re-defi nes healthcare and covers 
up this redefi nition. This transvaluation can be demasked as historically and theo-
logically conditioned; its grounds are up for scrutiny. As shown in the fi rst section, 
systematic theology provides not least a key critical heuristic for this challenge, the 
opposition between political economy and the notion of care and healing. The welfare 
state as one specifi c mediate institution between medicine and market is an occasion 
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at which this theological mediation moves into institutional forms. In concrete cases, 
this can lead to state-bureaucratic and managerial distortions as well as different kinds 
of complicities. Equally, non-state forms of care provision such as social entrepre-
neurship and diaconic organisations can function as such mediate institutions. 
 With reference to Hayek, we have also seen how the market paradigm gener-
ates ahistoricity as well as a lack of political responsibility (and imagination), 
exemplifi ed in the way DRGs were implemented. Against this I have emphasised 
both the signifi cance of history for any institution to be legitimate; and for mar-
ketisation to be re-embedded into political responsibilities, not least grounded in 
the interpretations of the past. 
 The problem of representation through coding systems such as the DRG was 
raised: they distort and re-direct care away from its  sui generis task. An adequate 
representation of care, however, has to be truthful in that it neither distorts nor 
blots out its own object, but rather furthers its continued re-instantiation. This 
connected to the fi nal point: problematic contradictions  within the profession cre-
ated by marketisation, which will also be dealt with in more detail in  Part III of 
this volume. Here different theological approaches fi nd ways to conceptualise and 
resolve the present fi ssure between the economic and medical logic. Granular dif-
ferences matter; Protestant/Reformed emphases on vocation eschatologically shift 
perspectives, or transformatively re-orient structures; the Catholic emphasis, more 
integral, emphasises dialogue and a creative-artisan fulfi llment of work. 
 For all their differences, these approaches imply that healthcare’s corporate-
personal responsibility cannot be absorbed into a jargon of ‘hybridisation’ or 
‘balancing’ contradictory tensions within a grid of maximising personal utility. 
Marketisation is not complete, as an intellectual paradigm, a jargon or a practice. 
The various critiques over the years have shown that a continuous exercise of 
freedom, politics, creativity and care  can reverse the transvaluation of healthcare, 
and reorient it towards its genuine end. 
 Notes 
 1 Therese Feiler gratefully acknowledges the support from the University of Oxford 
Wellcome Trust Institutional Strategic Support Fund (105605/Z/14/Z) and the Arts and 
Humanities Research Council (AH/N009770/1). 
 2  Pfi ster Lipp (2014 , pp. 59–64) identifi es four areas of concern: justice of care provision, 
quality of care, vocational ethos and work conditions. 
 3 Hayek’s parallels with Rawls explains their simultaneous success in the late twentieth 
century. 
 4 The irony of this twist – that marketisation engenders systems comparable to Soviet 
administration – should not be lost on the reader (see also  Bevan and Hood 2006 ). 
 5 See Margaret Thatcher’s infamous quip that the Good Samaritan needed money to pay 
for the victim’s care. This obvious point becomes problematic if she meant to say:  fi rst 
he needed to make money,  then he could help. 
 6 Mk 1:17 “Follow me, and I will make you fi sh for people.”; Matt 9:37f; Lk 10:2. Matt 
10:7–8 “As you go, proclaim the good news, ‘The kingdom of heaven has come near.’ 
Cure the sick, raise the dead, cleanse the lepers, cast out demons. You received without 
payment; give without payment” Cp. 1 Cor 3:9. 
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